By Younus Abdullah
Muhammad (may Allah hasten his release-AMEEN)
PS:
THIS EX-BROTHER OF OURS WAS RELEASED 7YRS IN ADVANCE DUE TO HIM COMPROMISING WITH THE KUFFAR, I.E. BECOMING A MURTAD WITH HIS COMPLETE ALLIANCE WITH THEM IN ASSISTING TO PLOT, PLAN AND PUT BEHIND BARS OUR MUSLIM BROTHERS AND SISTERS UPON HAQQ !!!
THIS IS HIS NEW/CHANGED TO OLD SELF NOW VIEWS:
An extremist’s path to academia -- and fighting terrorism
FOR MORE INSHA'ALLAH ONE CAN SEARCH, READ AND WATCH NEWS ON GOOGLE.
HOWEVER LET US BENEFIT FROM THE ARTICLE AS THIS WAS WRITTEN WHILST HE WAS A MUSLIM !
THIS EX-BROTHER OF OURS WAS RELEASED 7YRS IN ADVANCE DUE TO HIM COMPROMISING WITH THE KUFFAR, I.E. BECOMING A MURTAD WITH HIS COMPLETE ALLIANCE WITH THEM IN ASSISTING TO PLOT, PLAN AND PUT BEHIND BARS OUR MUSLIM BROTHERS AND SISTERS UPON HAQQ !!!
THIS IS HIS NEW/CHANGED TO OLD SELF NOW VIEWS:
An extremist’s path to academia -- and fighting terrorism
FOR MORE INSHA'ALLAH ONE CAN SEARCH, READ AND WATCH NEWS ON GOOGLE.
HOWEVER LET US BENEFIT FROM THE ARTICLE AS THIS WAS WRITTEN WHILST HE WAS A MUSLIM !
President Obama's well
organized speech in front of the UN General Assembly on September 24,
2013 was marked by an apparent recognition that the ensuing battle
for the future of the Middle East, as opposed to Asia, will determine
the near-term geopolitical future and balance of power in the world
for at least a generation to come. Up unto that point, Obama's
Mideast policy had been, by design, mostly rhetorical, meant to
salvage the Muslim world's public opinion as much as possible while
pivoting the loci of US concern to the projected high-growth
economies of East Asia. Mideastern interest was mostly confined to
preserving the US's unspoken military dominance in the Gulf and
increasingly East Africa.
President Obama's
election once spurred some early "hope" that US-Mideast
relations would alter but as scholar Fawaz Gerges has described it,
"contrary to the public perceptions, Obama's lofty rhetoric
about a new start in relations between the United States and Muslim
countries did not signify that the region ranked high on his foreign
policy agenda. When Israeli-Palestinian peace talks proved much
costlier than Obama and his advisers had foreseen, the president
first allowed his vice president to be humiliated by the Israeli
prime minister and then awkwardly disengaged from the peace process,
thereby undermining his own credibility and doing consequent damage
to America's prestige and influence. So while Obama has invested some
political effort on Mideast diplomacy, he has shown himself unwilling
to do more to achieve a breakthrough. The decision speaks volumes
about the administration's foreign policy priorities, as well as the
decline of American power and influence in the region." (Obama
and the Middle East, 2012, p.11)
Nevertheless, Obama's
latest UN address seemed to offer a 'reverse-pivot' and path to
serious reconcentration. In the speech Obama explained that the US
"will be engaged in the region for the long-haul" and he
suggested that reengagement will center around reinitiating the
Israel-Palestine peace process and resolving the Iranian nuclear
issue. Now, after five years of reduced focus, and in turn influence,
from all but the region's major oil producers, the Obama
administration has recognized that its withdrawal has created
conditions under which foreign powers have emerged and through which
regional discord, civil conflict and divide have exasperated. Today
stark division subsists not only between Sunnis and Shiites,
secularists and Islamists, but also increasingly between a
politicized and militant social underbelly and their elite and
traditionally Western-allied counterparts.
Obama's speech offered
one very promising principle that could slowly mediate such clash.
While addressing the unfolding conflict in Egypt, Obama expanded the
definition of American interests beyond oil, Israel and neoliberal
economics to include support for the development of government that
"legitimately reflects the collective will of the people."
If realized in practice and policy, that would prove a major
alteration that might initiate a new era and style of American
diplomacy. In the end, long-term lessons might be learned that
document concern with the promotion of pluralism and representative
governance leads to mutually beneficial engagement while real
politick masked in rhetoric more often than not results only in
entanglement and eventual catastrophe. If the past five years are any
indication Obama's words will prove merely a rhetorical tool, an
attempt to deflect the enhanced awareness that Obama really has not
had a Mideast policy. Whether because of that reality or in spite of
it, the center of gravity in international affairs has clearly
shifted back to the Middle East. Any actual connection between the
U.S. hegemon's vital interests and support and aid for authentic
representative government, with all the plurality and risk that
necessarily accompanies it, would not only represent a major change
in course but may usher in an era led by America in the Middle East.
The Obama presidency
began with an order to close Guantanamo Bay. In June of 2009 he went
to Cairo and called for a "new beginning between the United
States and Muslims." But, like his promise to close the
Guantanamo Prison, his efforts to improve relations have proven
overblown. It is important to recognize that Obama did not, at this
time, link democracy promotion to the national interests of either
the US or the people of the Middle East. In his Cairo address he
stated, "I know there has been controversy about the promotion
of democracy in recent years, and much of this controversy is
connected to the war in Iraq. So let me be clear: no system of
government can or should be imposed upon one nation by another."
As opposed to his democratic primary opponent Hillary Clinton,
now-President Obama actually rejected a policy of democratization and
reform initiated by President Bill Clinton in the 1990's after it
became apparent that political Islam was on the rise and the days of
Arab authoritarianism were numbered. Instead, Obama called Mubarak a
"stalwart ally" and when the Arab Spring protests rent
asunder in Tunisia and Egypt his Vice President Joe Biden refused to
label Mubarak a dictator. In actuality, US reaction sought to subvert
Egyptian protests and first to replace Mubarak with his vice
president, Omar Suleiman. They maintained support for Ben Ali in
Tunisia until his departure and continue to support oil-rich
autocrats in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. They increased military
support and cooperation in Yemen even after the regime started firing
on protestors and then were pressured by Britain and France to
intervene in Libya before remaining totally lethargic so far with
regard to Syria. Contrary to the popular American narrative, the
number one obstacle in the way of Obama's actual foreign policy
strategy has been the surging demand for democratically-minded
transformation across the Middle East.
Despite the recent
reversion to authoritarianism and other complications, any lasting US
influence in the Muslim world "for the long haul" will
necessitate both policy and practice that tracks closer to the
democratic oratory espoused by Obama's teleprompter. Egypt, home of a
quarter of the Arab world's population and arguably its cultural
center, represents the best opportunity for such alterations. At the
same time it is a case study in American hypocrisy. In Obama's UN
speech he argued that in Egypt Mohammed Morsi was elected but "proved
unwilling or unable to govern in a way that was mutually exclusive."
The President said nothing however of the reempowered military junta
presently running the country with its long experice in autocracy.
And Obama emphasized that the US "purposefully avoided choosing
sides" while failing to mention that by refusing to classify the
intervention as a coup the US has clearly made its decision. "We
have determined that it is not in the best interests of the United
States to make that determination," as he put it before. He then
went on to connect US interests to the support and aid of government
reflecting the "collective will" of the Egyptian people.
However, "collective will" is a vague term that can easily
be manipulated in definition, away from one that supports government
for the people by the people and into one that serves as a cover for
a return to elite dictatorship protected by sustained US assistance.
So far US policy has show
no sign of promoting actual pluralism. In August, Secretary of State
John Kerry described the coup in Egypt as "restoring democracy."
That was right before the regime gunned down hundreds of nonviolent,
pro-Morsi protestors, classifying the women and children killed as
terrorists, rounded up the leaders of the nonviolent Muslim
Brotherhood and imprisoned them on trumped up charges, shut off free
expression, closed down television stations, imposed curfews and
reset emergency laws from the Mubarak era. As the late Christopher
Hitchens succinctly described it, most nations are states that have
militaries but Egypt is a military that has a state. The root
obstacle now to pluralism and government representative of the
collective will in Egypt is in fact the 'deep state' that revolves
around the military. In reaction to the clear coup, the Obama
administration merely canceled a joint military exercise, temporarily
reviewed the $1.3 billion in military aid before sustaining the bulk
of it and has sat idly since as all genuine political plurality has
been subverted. For their part, the EU conducted an "urgent
review of Egyptian relations" partially suspended the export of
military equipment and continued most of a $5 billion package in
loans and aid to support "democratic transitions." Such
assistance will further entrench the return of Egyptian
totalitarianism.
These efforts at
'democracy restoration' do not represent the plurality of either Arab
or Egyptian thought. Neither the Egyptian military or US government
has ever supported Mideast publics. In reality, such manipulation is
part and parcel of a sustained suppression of political Islam that
has hallmarked the West's creation of the modern Middle East through
the secretive Sykes-Picot accords of the first world war era. The
preference for Arab authoritarianism has only heightened since it
became clear in the 1990's that any free and fair elections would
bring Islamists to power. The interim Egyptian government has issued
a "road map" to restore elections. However, that road map
was drawn up absent consultation, even with members of the anti-Morsi
coalition busy slogging that the people and the military are "one
hand." The interim government announced a 50-member panel that
will draft a new constitution, but that panel will include only two,
pro-regime Islamists and so could not be realistically representative
of Egyptian aspirations. The people of Egypt overwhelmingly elected
Islamists in initial parliamentary and presidential elections. And
while the so-called Islamist constitution of Morsi passed through
national referendum, the new constitution will be put to no test
other than the scrutiny of a judiciary that recently added insult to
injury by releasing Hosni Mubarak from his prison chains.
The interim government is
led by former finance minister Hazem el-Bablawi, a proponent of the
neoliberal reforms induced under Mubarak who argues for an outright
ban of the Muslim Brotherhood. Actual Egyptian political plurality,
not unlike the rest of the Middle East, is extremely diverse. True
liberals performed horribly in early elections but represent a
growing segment of society especially amongst the youth. The National
Salvation Front is a coalition of parties that range from strict
secularists, to Nasserites, communists, and people of all political
persuasions. The ultraorthodox salafi al-Nour party won more than a
quarter of the seats in Egypt's first parliament. The nationalist
al-Wafd party, present in Egypt since the days of British
colonialism, has a heavy constituency and many other parties and
platforms formulated in the early days after the Arab Spring. The
coup and return of control to the military backed by the judiciary
and its remnants of the Mubarak-age will only subvert the collective
will of the Egyptian mass through a return to one-party dominance.
Much has been made about
the Obama administration's embracement of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Truth be told, such embracement had more to do with pragmatism than
any actual support for change. The US wields tremendous global
economic influence and with the Egyptian economy on the brink of
collapse it wasn't hard to imagine that the Islamists early election
victories would be short gained. President Morsi was no radical. He
appointed General Sissi to please the US and his constitution did
nothing to take away the military's powers. He shut out his salafist
counterparts almost altogether. He embraced IMF loans and hosted a
trade delegation for major US multinationals. US communication was
always paternalistic. For example, John Kerry attached its meager
financial support to Morsi's backing of IMF reform. "In light of
Egypt's extreme needs and President Morsi's assurance that he plans
to complete the IMF process, today I have advised him that the US
will now provide the first $190 million of our pledged $450 million
in budget support funds," he said. At the onset of Egyptian
protests against a controversial Youtube video last September, Obama
called Morsi's government a "work in progress." The Obama
administration clearly recognized that the Muslim Brotherhood led
government would be constrained by an obstructionist judiciary that
had already dismissed a democratically elected Islamist parliament
and was blocking the new constitution.
However, when Morsi
issued decrees granting himself temporary autocratic powers, the
Obama administration advocated for reforms that would have entrenched
the pre-Arab Spring network of privilege that helps to effectively
make Egypt a US client state. The administration advised that Morsi
make cabinet changes and that "the art of politics is to give
your adversaries something," a lesson the Obama administration
will soon learn as the US government shuts down. The US maintained
contact with General Abdel Fattah al-Sissi. Pentagon chief Chuck
Hagel was "impressed" with the former US resident. The
White House distanced itself from the coup and continued to advise
Morsi to appoint a new Prime Minister. Still, their passive reaction
since documents a sustained indifference to authoritarianism in the
name of stability and an aversion to any type of actual Arab-world
reform representative of its populace's diversity.
Obama's reverse pivot has
much to do with perceptions of America's waning influence and the
prospect that other powers will step in to fill the void. Any true
Middle Eastern alteration, especially if achieved by Islamists
moderate or extreme, would threaten an international order
increasingly controlled by a global ,as opposed to a western, elite.
That elite includes the Middle East's own aristocracy. Saudi Arabia,
for example, a country infuriated by Obama's apparent embracement of
the Arab Spring and Brotherhood, pledged $12 billion in aid to Egypt
along with Dubai to support the Morsi coup. Then on August 8, as
pressure for the suspension of US, EU aid intensified, Prince Bandar
bin Sultan, head of Saudi intelligence and close confidante of the
Bush family, appeared in Russia for direct talks with Vladimir Putin.
He was no doubt there to discuss Putin's support for Syrian dictator
Bashar al-Assad, the Gulf Cooperation Council's push for a New Middle
East modeled on preserving authoritarianism and potential future
inroads for Russian military sales in the event the West pursued a
course consistent with human rights. On August 9, Saudi King Abdullah
donated $100 million for a US counterterrorism center as Egyptian
rhetoric portraying all Islamists as terrorists paved the way for
coming massacres. Such emboldened diplomacy led Egypt's military to
state on August 18 that its relationship with the US and other
western governments was "under review." In a sense, these
gestures held the West hostage and forced them to consider the
prospects for a returning power struggle along Cold War lines.
Russia would gladly
replace Western arms sales in the region and any discussion of a New
Middle East, along with the aid, infrastructure investment and loans
that would accompany it, represents a potential threat to American
dominance. Any offloading of the more than one trillion in
petrodollar reserves held by Arab sovereign wealth funds could
collapse America's economic imperium. If supported by Russia, in
allegiance with Brazil, China, India or South Africa, an alternative
international monetary order could form. OPEC nations could dismember
that present order tomorrow by simply removing oil's pricing in US
dollar terms. No doubt the realists that hold the actual reign of US
power were properly alarmed. Consequently, it is little wonder
America accepted the Saudi-induced coup and little wonder Obama no
longer wants to "lead from behind" in the Middle East. The
ultimate reverberations have already induced alternative solutions in
Syria (Assad 'must not go now') and in negotiations with Iran, both
allies of Russia.
These international connections
highlight the reality that the Egyptian military's putsch represents
a neo-fascist trend in international relations, marked by a merger
between state and corporate power that relegates government so it
serves the needs of an interconnected global elite. That growing
movement, typically clothed in the rhetoric of democracy, represents
the most serious challenge to the balance democratic nation states
inherently offer against transnational powers. Today, from the US in
the West to China in the East, national policies are increasingly
dictated by globally-minded influences, from multinational
corporations, a military, industrial complex, international financial
institutions and other institutions that serve the primary interests
(namely immediate profit) of upper-tiered income earners around the
world. Under these conditions, the politics of democracy becomes a
mere shadow cast on populations by the "interest" of
elites. If viewed from this radical perspective, these influences
become evident in the Egyptian coup.
The Egyptian Army, with
an annual budget of $4 billion represents the fourteenth largest army
in the world. Because the military's influence, in conjunction with
the state bureaucracy, extends to every sector of society it is home
to some of the most lucrative international contracts. Whether by way
of interest rates paid on Egyptian bonds, the sale of weaponry,
foreign direct investment or the import of subsidized American food,
Egypt serves as a major stimulus for transnational capitalists. Saudi
Arabia, a country General Sissi also served in thoroughly, is
exemplative of the same. Saudis not only send all their petrodollars
back to Wall Street and the City of London for investment, but they
have signed record-breaking arms contracts over recent years.
The late Chalmers Johnson
described the Saudi military nexus in his book The Sorrows of Empire
(2004), "Vinnell Corp. a Northern Grumman firm in Fairfax,
Virginia has had primary responsibility for training the Saudi
National Guard and has, 'constructed, run, written doctrine for, and
staffed five Saudi military academies, seven shooting ranges, and a
health care system, while training and equipping four Saudi
mechanized brigades and five infantry brigades. Saudi Arabia has, in
turn, funneled hundreds of millions of dollars into major defense
corporations to equip those forces." As in Dubai, Saudi's
partner in the Egyptian coup, where the former CEO of Blackwater, the
US's foremost private mercenary firm, resides and provides security
for the regime, military equipment and training focuses on protecting
the dictatorship from domestic uprising, particularly pertinent in
lieu of the Arab Spring. The $12 billion in aid to Egypt will help
temporarily quell an impending economic crisis but their concern with
the prospects of an altered US government have nothing to do with
private western power. In the weeks following the Egyptian
counterrevolution, Saudi Arabia awarded $22.5 billion in
infrastructure contracts to three Western-led consortiums for a
metro-system in Riyadh.
Obama didn't mention any
intention of promoting governments reflecting the collective will of
Saudi, Bahraini, or Emirati societies. Today's US-led international
military-industrial complex has outgrown what Dwight Eisenhower once
referred to as its, "total influence - economic, political, even
spiritual." The global elite's influence often trumps sovereign
political decisions around the world and runs contrary to public
opinion. Factions of that network no doubt gave the go-ahead for the
Egyptian coup. Egypt's stock market rose 7% in its initial days. So
when Egypt's interim ministry reestablished the national security
state by gunning down peaceful protesters with live ammunition, the
US president remained effectively silent and the secretary of state
issued a vague and implicit message to the Muslim Brotherhood to
"step back from the brink." When the military rigs future
elections and reestablishes Mubarak-like rule, Egyptian liberals may
realize that they effectively backed a counterrevolution and
Islamists will learn again that America's rhetoric about
democratization cannot be believed.
Another factor of realism
weighing on Obama's repivot had to be an awareness that the Muslims
Brotherhood's failure in democratic participation will prove a boon
to militant, revolutionary Islam of the Al-Qaeda type. The
alterations and divisions now percolating in Egypt are similar to a
previous era. In the late 1980's political Islamists were gaining
ground in Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan, while in Sudan a military coup
installed Omar al-Basheer. Then, when the Algerian Salvation Front
(FIS) won a surprising victory in first round parliamentary elections
in December, 1991, it sent ripples of caution throughout the
international community. Political Islam was on the rise. In realy
January, 1992 the Algerian military cancelled the elections, banned
the FIS and arrested and tortured hundreds of its supporters. The
French backed the coup and the first Bush administration followed
suit with tacit approval. Algeria subsequently descended into more
than a decade of civil war that took over 100,000 lives. Today, Egypt
also rests on the brink of civil discord.
Attacks on Egyptian
security forces and police officers are rising. Low-level insurgent
violence has increased in the Sinai and has reemerged along the Nile
Valley for the first time since the 1990's.
Weapons from Libya and
Syria are readily available. A 2008 cable from the US embassy in
Cairo released by Wikileaks cited US analysts as claiming the
Egyptian armed forces were unable to engage in combat and cited their
inability to quell Islamist insurgency in the Sinai as an example. A
front for militants in Egypt would only add to the appeal of groups
like Al-Qaeda. In Algeria it was six months after the military
cancelled elections before jihadists assassinated the interim prime
minister and nine months before the first bombing. As Secretary of
State Clinton put it before leaving her post, the US "has got to
have a better strategy... the Arab Spring has ushered in a time when
Al-Qaeda is on the rise."
Indeed that is the case.
In early August the Obama administration ordered 19 embassies closed
and issued a worldwide travel alert. In Afghanistan, where Al-Qaeda
and the Taliban are set to declare victory at the end of 2014,
casualties amongst Afghan troops are at all-time highs. The Pakistani
Taliban have surged in influence and just killed more than 70
Christians in church allegedly in retaliation for US drone attacks.
Three US citizens apparently took part in the recent mall attack in
Nairobi. The Shabab claims to have more attacks planned. Meanwhile,
jihadists flock to Northern Syria from all over the world in ways
typical of Afghanistan in the 1980's. To coincide with the September
11th anniversary Al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri directed offshoots
to continue focusing on attacks inside America. Intercepted
communication between he and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader
Nasr al-Wuhaishi triggered the embassy closure. Militant Islam will
only increase under the reimposition of Mideast authoritarianism. So
groups like Al-Qaeda have also proved primary beneficiaries exerting
pressure on President Obama to reengage.
Despite these
nondemocratic pulls, Obama should utilize his last three years in
office to initiate both policy and practice that promotes true
reform. Initial efforts could pave the way for sustained engagement
under a likely Hillary Clinton presidency. Principled policy that
pushes for actual pluralism and political contestation poses an
alternative paradigm, something sorely needed to break the tragic
status quo. Linking US interests to government reflective of the
collective will could create conditions that actuate a
crosspollination in political ideology. This typically embeds secular
notions of the separation between religion and state, no matter the
oratory of religious parties. Defending free expression and
association helps to promote political contestation over violence.
These axioms make the democratic experiment attractive to people
across the globe and Arabs are no exception. However, in practice US
policy has consistently undermined these principles. It is time to
temper America's engagement with realpolitik.
It is also important to
recognize that plurality in the Middle East necessitates a role for
political Islam. As Olivier Roy described it when Islamists surged in
multiple elections in 2012, "Liberalism does not precede
democracy; America's founding fathers were not liberal. But once
democracy is rooted in institutions and political culture, then the
debate on freedom, censorship, social norms and individual rights can
be managed through freedom of expression and changes of majorities in
parliament. However, there will be no institutionalization of
democracy without the Muslim Brothers." That analysis remains
true and the US must do its best to promote a return of Islamists to
political participation in Egypt in ways that allow them to learn
from their mistakes and hold sway.
Since its ascension after
the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, US policy in the Middle East has been
marked by a dissonance and anger created by the contradiction between
an espousal of Wilsonian idealism and behavior derived solely from
self-interests. Under realpolitik, concrete reality not ideology
shapes the world. As Dr. Henry Kissinger described it in his
Diplomacy (1994), "One of the principle tasks of statesmanship
is to understand which subjects are truly related and can be used to
reinforce each other. For the most part, the policymaker has little
choice in the matter. Ultimately, it is reality, not policy, that
links events. The statesman's role is to recognize the relationship
when it does exist - in other words, to create a network of
incentives and penalties to produce the most favorable outcome."
50 years of failed diplomacy in the Middle East should document that
it is time to realize idealistic notions of promoting government for
the people by the people with more than rhetoric and absent the
footprint of occupation are truly linked to US peace and prosperity.
Therefore it can be argued that crafting networks of incentives and
penalties to attain democratic objectives would in fact pave the way
for mutually beneficial and realistic outcomes beneficial to all.
The contradiction between
US behavior and its expressed belief has helped to cement a cognitive
dissonance amongst the primary drivers of US policy that blocks the
realization that realism has mostly failed wherever it contradicts
so-called American values. Blindness of this actuality explains how a
Wall Street Journal editorial, and others likely it, are able to
advise a continuation of US support for the Egyptian military because
it "buys access with the generals." And why it can then
explain with a straight face that, "Egyptians would be lucky if
their new ruling generals turn out to be in the mold of Chile's
Augusto Pinochet, who took power amid chaos but hired free market
reformers and midwifed a transition to democracy." In reality,
Pinochet was put in charge with the assistance of none other than
Henry Kissinger and the CIA. He overthrew Chilean democracy and was
ultimately charged with international war crimes. In September, 2000
the CIA was forced to finally reveal that in Chile it, "sought
to instigate a coup to prevent Allende from taking office after he
won a plurality." Pinochet was assassinating protestors and
executing political opponents while the US sustained sales of
"controversial military equipment." It took 17 years for
Chile to restore democracy and today a rapacious elite continues to
rein despite reestablished elections. Chile remains a country with an
incredible gap between rich and poor. However, because Chile is now a
part of the neoliberal order for the Wall Street Journal it is a
success story. It is unacknowledged contradictions like these that
allow John Kerry to describe the similar situation unfolding in Egypt
today as 'democratic restoration.
The gist of Obama's
rhetoric is actually not that new. His initial National Security
Strategy outlined that the U.S. would, "reject the notions that
lasting security and prosperity can be formed by turning away from
universal rights" and that democracy "does not merely
represent our better angels; it stands in opposition to aggression
and injustice. And our support for human rights is fundamental to
American leadership and source of our strength in the world."
Additionally, in accepting his Nobel Prize, President Obama rejected
"a tension between those who describe themselves as realists or
idealists" and explained, "no matter how callously defined,
neither American interests nor the world's are served by the denial
of human aspirations." While not even the hallmark of his UN
address however, Obama's connection between the collective will of
Arab publics and the national interest of the United States
represents a principle of foreign policy that can be measured. It is
only by surveying that record and realizing that it has consistently
been opposed that one can see the prospect for positive change if
Obama chooses to practice what is preached.
Such a proposition has
recently been documented by American political scientist Amaney
Jamal. In her important and courageous new book Of Empires and
Citizens (2013) she confirms that the US has always insisted on
"pro-American democracy or no democracy at all" in the
Middle East. Dr. Jamal's thesis that Arab societies are "divided
between the people who benefited from their leader's relationship
with the United States and therefore sought to preserve the
dictatorship and those that did not, and therefore sought democracy"
has generated expected but unfair criticism. Nevertheless, such an
empirical recognition documents that the 'collective will' of Mideast
peoples has always been defined, at least in the minds of US
planners, as equivocal to the perspectives of those interested in
preserving the regime. Grasping these relationships leads to an
understanding of how the American Empire has expanded on colonialist
tools for indirect rule. As Mark Lynch, the Obama administration's
chief academic advisor during the Arab Spring, put it in Foreign
Affairs (May, June 2013), "If Jamal is right then much of the
received wisdom of the last decade needs to be reconsidered."
No academic that wants to
stay in favor can take that position however. In turn he dismisses
her claims as farfetched and instead defers to neo-Orientalism,
explaining that Mideast publics, and by discrete extension Dr. Jamal,
suffer from 'cognitive bias' - "the misplaced belief that
Washington's power to shape their lives is actually much more
interesting than the prosaic truth." In reality, Lynch's
dismissiveness is typical of the hubris and cognitive dissonance that
helps Americans justify its role in making the Muslim world the
democratic exception. Conjuring up pejorative labels like 'the Arab
Street' helps the wielders of power blame the victims themselves. As
Fawaz Gerges explains it, the Arab Street "is a derisive term so
often used by the foreign policy community and even by the best
Western journalists [that] is in great part a myth that has prevented
US policymakers from examining or even acknowledging the existence of
civil society politics." Realistically attending to the
collective will of the people and connecting that attention to US
interests would require such altered realizations. Effecting
alterations in defense of the actual collective will of Mideast
peoples would require a refusal to participate in authoritarianism.
The use of carrots and sticks, or what Kissinger described as a
"network of incentives and penalties to produce the most
favorable outcomes" has always sought to preserve the status quo
and in opposition to publics. That explains Obama's general failure
in Mideast policy, the indifference to the Egyptian coup, and his
initial disinterest in engaging at all with the faultiness his
predecessor's efforts to impose pro-American democracy by force had
exposed.
Promoting government that
"legitimately reflects the collective will of the people"
would serve US interests, especially in the long-term. Apart from
seeking to reignite the Israeli, Palestinian peace process and to
negotiate with Iran, Obama should make some clear, principled
alterations that would have wide appeal. First, the US should
immediately halt its military aid to Egypt, making it contingent on
the removal of repressions and the reimposition of multiparty
civilian rule open to all sectors of society. Gulf sheikhdoms may
provide cash but they cannot provide actual weapons or development
and while majorities in Egypt have sided with the coup, that support
will twiddle away when it becomes apparent Egypt will only return to
the age of Mubarak. The military and whoever might be elected to head
the new regime will not be able to reimplement authoritarian rule
without sustained US assistance. The immediate reaction may be
nationalist and anti-American, at least from some sectors of society,
but it will subsequently craft a 'collective will' that ultimately
proves supportive.
At the same time, the US
should arm Syria's rebels and counter Russia and Iran's massive
support for the Assad regime. No matter ongoing diplomatic efforts to
remove chemical weapon stockpiles, the 'collective will' of the
Syrian people also needs supported. For over two years they've
suffered most from Obama's disengagement. It is time to usher in an
era of foreign policy distinct from Kissinger's realism. On Syria,
Obama has followed his advice completely. In a Washington Post
editorial from 2012 entitled, 'The Perils of Intervention', Dr.
Kissinger argued against humanitarian intervention in Syria and
democracy promotion on the grounds it would endanger the world order
and induce lawlessness. He asked whether humanitarianism as a
principle of foreign policy implied that a vital but nondemocratic
nation like Saudi Arabia should be opposed simply because "public
demonstrations develop on its territory." One year later, Syria
indeed lay in lawless shambles with over 100,000 dead and the world
order remains subject to disintegration. Kissinger's point on Saudi
Arabia however leads to another necessary adjustment.
Were the promotion of
'collective will' as a principle of foreign policy actually adopted,
the Saudi regime would not be opposed once public demonstrations
formulated. Instead, it would be subject to immediate cessation in
aid and support simply on the grounds it quells all internal dissent
and serves as the primary obstacle to development. Prince Alwaleed
bin Talal recently warned in an open letter to oil minister Ali
Naima, "the world is increasingly less dependent on oil from
OPEC countries including the kingdom." The US shale revolution
implies the strategic partnership with the House of Saud is no longer
appropriate or necessary; now that is true from both realist and
idealist positions.
Additionally, discussions
with Iran, no matter the displeasure of Benjamin Netanyahu, must
continue. The last thing the Mideast or America needs is conflict in
Iran that could pull the US into another quagmire or even lead to the
breakout of World War III. Iran's new president Hassan Rouhani is no
doubt sincere and the potential for peace far exceeds the associated
risks, regardless of whether the Ayatollahs will accept the outcome
of negotiations. Iran is nowhere close to developing actual nuclear
weapons and rational discourse between US and Iranian officials would
certainly generate valuable political and human capital, especially
amongst the next generation of Mideast leaders. To that end, the US
must understand that meaningful negotiations about the
Israel-Palestine peace process cannot occur until the US makes
sustained assistance for Israel contingent on its cessation of
settlement construction. It is absolutely insane to expect the
Palestinians to enter negotiations while Israeli occupation is
expanding.
Finally, the effects of
such an actual expansion in the definition of US interests would
entail a "long haul" commitment to development. In the
immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, the US and Europe discussed a
New Marshall Plan for the Middle East with Egypt as its pillar.
However, to this date US, EU assistance is below the one trillion
dollar mark. Yet, in his national security speech in May of this
year, Obama claimed foreign assistance is "fundamental to our
national security and it is fundamental to any sensible long-term
strategy to battle extremism." In cooperation with the rest of
the international community and especially its local NGO's, a
long-term plan for Mideast development should be prepared and funded
and a few major initial projects should be initiated immediately.
All of this may seem
idealist and the odds are that the traditional principles that have
driven US policy will maintain. However, we should contemplate the
long-term consequence of a sustained mismatch between our speech and
action. At the same time we might also pause to question why, no
matter the degree of corporate propaganda, US domestic policy also
seems unrepresentative of the 'collective will' and instead caters to
an elite. Absent such alterations democracy on American shores will
continue to trend much closer to Egyptian totalitarianism.
Younus Abdullah
Muhammad is a master of international affairs and American Muslim
presently incarcerated in the US federal prison system.
PS:
THIS EX-BROTHER OF OURS WAS RELEASED 7YRS IN ADVANCE DUE TO HIM COMPROMISING WITH THE KUFFAR, I.E. BECOMING A MURTAD WITH HIS COMPLETE ALLIANCE WITH THEM IN ASSISTING TO PLOT, PLAN AND PUT BEHIND BARS OUR MUSLIM BROTHERS AND SISTERS UPON HAQQ !!!
THIS IS HIS NEW/CHANGED TO OLD SELF NOW VIEWS:
An extremist’s path to academia -- and fighting terrorism
FOR MORE INSHA'ALLAH ONE CAN SEARCH, READ AND WATCH NEWS ON GOOGLE.
THIS EX-BROTHER OF OURS WAS RELEASED 7YRS IN ADVANCE DUE TO HIM COMPROMISING WITH THE KUFFAR, I.E. BECOMING A MURTAD WITH HIS COMPLETE ALLIANCE WITH THEM IN ASSISTING TO PLOT, PLAN AND PUT BEHIND BARS OUR MUSLIM BROTHERS AND SISTERS UPON HAQQ !!!
THIS IS HIS NEW/CHANGED TO OLD SELF NOW VIEWS:
An extremist’s path to academia -- and fighting terrorism
FOR MORE INSHA'ALLAH ONE CAN SEARCH, READ AND WATCH NEWS ON GOOGLE.
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